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The propensity of humans to engage in prosocial behavior is unlike that of any other species.
Individuals will help others even when it comes at a cost to themselves, and even when
the others are complete strangers. However, to date, scant empirical evidence has been
forthcoming on young children’s altruistic tendencies.To investigate this 45 4-year-oldswere
presented with a task in which they had opportunity to help an adult confederate retrieve a
reward from a novel box. In a control condition children were given no information about the
effect of potential helping behavior. Alternatively they were informed that helping would
either cost them (i.e., they would miss out on getting the reward) or beneﬁt them (i.e., they
would get the reward). It was hypothesized that children would be less likely, and slower,
to help in the cost condition, compared to the other two conditions. This hypothesis was
not supported: children across all conditions provided help at near ceiling levels.
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INTRODUCTION
Humans are highly prosocial beings; we share our food, we give
gifts, we hold open doors for people, we inform others with help-
ful information, and we comfort those who have lost a loved one.
Moreover, capable of altruistic behavior, we will help others when
it incurs a considerable cost to ourselves, and even when the recip-
ients of the help are not related to us (Trivers, 1971; Zahavi, 2003).
This tendency to engage in prosocial behavior emerges early, with,
for example, children in the ﬁrst half of their second year directing
an adult to the location of an ostensibly missing item (Liszkowski
et al., 2006). But whether or not children show altruism if such
prosocial behavior incurs an immediate and direct cost has not,
hitherto, been ﬁrmly established.
As already alluded to, the prosocial proclivity of infants and
young children has been well documented (for a recent review see
Paulus, 2014). As early as 6 months of age, infants are sensitive to
fairness and prefer helpful individuals over unhelpful ones (Ham-
lin et al., 2007; although see Scarf et al., 2012), by 12 months they
begin to provide helpful information to others (Liszkowski et al.,
2008) and as they move into their second year begin sharing toys
with an unfamiliar adult (Schmidt and Sommerville, 2011) and
same-aged peers (Hay et al., 1991). Moreover, in this period infants
become increasingly capable of providing instrumental help; that
is, helping another achieve a goal. In a landmark study Warneken
and Tomasello (2006) presented 18-month-olds with a range of
scenarios in which an adult needed help to achieve a goal that was
not directly for the infant (e.g., the adult dropped a peg out of
reach while trying to hang a towel on a line or he attempted to
open a cabinet while holding a stack of magazines that prohib-
ited him from doing so). When confronted with these situations
the infants spontaneously reacted by helping the adult (e.g., by
retrieving the peg for him or by opening the door) without being
explicitly asked to and despite receiving no reward or praise for
their actions. A follow up study found 14-month-olds could show
this kind of helping behavior but only on ‘out-of-reach’ tasks such
as the clothesline example noted above (Warneken and Tomasello,
2007).
Moving into childhood, Brownell et al. (2009) presented 18-
and 25-month-olds infants with a task requiring them to pull
one of two handles attached to a pair of trays in order to obtain
a reward. Pulling one of the handles delivered a loaded tray
to the child and to an adult confederate, whereas pulling the
alternative handle delivered a loaded tray to the child only. The 25-
month-olds children chose the prosocial option, delivering food to
themselves and the adult, signiﬁcantly more than the 18-month-
olds, with the latter needing more verbal cues from the adult to
recognize the joint goal available. House et al. (2012) used a sim-
ilar design with 3- to 8-year-olds, ﬁnding high levels of prosocial
behavior with the younger children performing at similar levels to
the older children, suggesting that spontaneous prosocial behavior
becomes ﬁrmly established through the childhood period.
Further, a more recent study by Warneken and Tomasello
(2013) suggests that by 3.5 years, children will start to modify their
prosocial behavior depending on the partner’s previous behavior
(i.e., if the partner has cooperated with them in the past or not).
However, this was only apparent in sharing but not helping sit-
uations, where in the case of the latter children performed at
near ceiling levels. That is, children will share more with some-
one who has previously shared with them, but another’s previous
helping behavior does not inﬂuence children’s current helping.
Nevertheless, as with the afore-cited research, the helping task did
not incur any cost to the children if they decided to help, which
may explain the high levels children evidenced. Indeed, in studies
where childrenmustmake a choice between a division of resources
that is self-advantageous, neutral or other-advantageous (e.g.,
Thompson et al., 1998; Fehr et al., 2008; Paulus and Moore, 2014;
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Williams and Moore, 2014) older children (e.g., 7- to 8-year-olds)
prefer allocations that remove advantageous or disadvantageous
inequality whereas younger children (3- to 4-year-olds) behave
selﬁshly.
Further insight into what might happen to prosocial behavior
in infants and young children if there is some cost involved comes
from a study by Svetlova et al. (2010) who presented 18- and 30-
month-oldswith a series of scenarios inwhich an adult confederate
needed instrumental help (e.g., getting a clothes pin to continue
clipping fabric to a clothes line), empathetic help (e.g., getting a
blanket that belonged to the adult because she was cold) or altru-
istic help (e.g., giving a blanket to the experimenter that belonged
to the child). The latter was considered costly for the child, as
he/she had to sacriﬁce his/her own belongings (albeit temporar-
ily). Although 30-month-olds helped signiﬁcantly more overall,
children of both ages helped more in the instrumental condition
than in the empathetic condition, and signiﬁcantly more often
in the empathetic condition than in the altruistic condition. This
suggests that children’s motivation to help is decreased when there
is a cost involved, compared to when there is no cost, as children
were less inclined to sacriﬁce their own possessions in order to
help the adult.
The above ﬁndings are in line with suggestions by political and
theoretical economists that individuals are predominantly inclined
to act with informed self-interest, where it is considered to be
more proﬁtable to be cooperative in the long-term but selﬁsh in
the short-term (e.g., Simon, 1956; Monroe, 1984). However, Hay
et al. (1991) argue that this rational approach to resource sharing
is in conﬂict with children’s need to interact positively and harmo-
niously with others (cf., Paulus and Moore, 2012). In Svetlova et al.
(2010) children had to give up something already in their posses-
sion, where the pull to self-interest is likely to be at it’s strongest.
If young children are indeed driven by self-interest then altruism
should remain evident even if the obvious proﬁtability of being
selﬁsh in the short-term is reduced and the opportunity to interact
positively is increased.
To evaluate this the current experiment implemented a costly
helping task whereby young children needed to forgo the oppor-
tunity to get a desirable item (i.e., before they had possessed it)
in order to help a relative stranger get that item. Speciﬁcally, in
the primary experimental condition children were presented with
an opportunity to help a confederate adult obtain a desirable food
reward, an opportunity that would subsequently bemade available
to the child if she/he chose not to help. Children’s responses in this
condition were compared to children who were directly rewarded
for helping and to those for whom no direct cost or beneﬁt was
made apparent. Based on past ﬁndings that children are driven
by short-term self-interest we hypothesized that when given an
opportunity to help an unfamiliar adult when a future cost is at
stake children would be less likely to do so (and slower when they
did provide help) than when there was no cost involved, or when
there was a direct beneﬁt on offer.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Forty-ﬁve children (19 male and 26 female) aged between 3 years
9 months and 4 years 5 months (M = 4 years, SD = 7.24)
participated in this study, which took place at dedicated testing
facilities of a large, metropolitan university. We chose to study
children at this age as prior research has documented 3- to 4-year-
olds behave selﬁshly when they must make a choice between a
division of resources (e.g., Thompson et al., 1998; Fehr et al., 2008;
Paulus and Moore, 2014; Williams and Moore, 2014). Participants
were recruited through a database of parents who had previously
expressed interest in having their children participate in research.
An additional child was omitted from the ﬁnal sample due to a
malfunction with the recording equipment. Of the ﬁnal sample
of 45 children, 44 spoke English as their primary language (the
other spoke Japanese, but was bilingual) and the vast majority had
parents who had at least 12 years of schooling (95% of mothers;
93% of fathers). Children were allocated in equal numbers to one
of three conditions (detailed below). This study was cleared in
accordance with the ethical review processes of the University of
Queensland and within the guidelines of the National Statement
on Ethical Conduct in Human Research.
MATERIALS
Box
Children were presented with a rectangular wooden box
(48.2 cm × 25.5 cm × 13.2 cm) made up of three different col-
ored compartments (see Figure 1), mounted on a wooden base.
The lid of the box could be ﬁxed shut with a wooden latch, and
the lid was transparent, allowing children to see the reward when
FIGURE 1 |Test apparatus and associated tools.
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placed inside. Each reward consisted of a plastic orange pod that
contained two jellybeans (or two stickers if parents preferred their
children did not receive jellybeans). Each compartment had a dif-
ferent sized opening on one side (1, 1.3, and 2.1 cm diameter, for
the white, black, and orange compartments respectively), which
lined up with a chute in which the pods were placed. On the other
side of each chute were larger openings (4 cm diameter) from
which each pod could exit the apparatus.
Tools
Three tools (see Figure 1) were presented to the children: (1) a
22 cm long orange wooden dowel; (2) a 20 cm long black screw-
driver; and (3) a 30 cm long white pipe-cleaner. Each tool was
used to retrieve a reward from its corresponding compartment as
determined by their matching color.
The three-compartment apparatus was used to provide some
independence across trials while minimizing the need for chil-
dren to learn and remember how to operate each component. The
explicit tool-compartment matching was done to ease the cogni-
tive load of the task by enabling children to link the appropriate
tool to the appropriate section of the apparatus.
PROCEDURE
On arrival at the university the child and his/her caregiver were
brought into a ‘warm up room,’ in which they could play with toys
and become familiar with the two experimenters (E1 and E2) and
the test-environment. Once children seemed comfortable and at
ease, they were brought into the test room by E1. The children
and E1 sat on the ﬂoor of the test room with the box and three
tools placed between them. The child’s caregiver(s) also sat in
the room and was given two questionnaires to complete, so that
his/her attention was taken away from the child at test. During
the entire procedure the box was only ever loaded with one pod
at a time, with the order in which each compartment was used
counterbalanced across children and conditions. E1 ﬁrst showed
the child how to retrieve the pod using the relevant tool, and
then gave him/her a turn. All children were successfully able to
use the tools to retrieve the appropriate pod. Following the child’s
turn a confederate (E2), who was blind to the study aims and
hypotheses, entered the room where she ‘tried’ to retrieve the pod
but to no avail. That is, she deliberately exhibited actions that were
not functional in retrieving the pod, such as using her ﬁngers to try
and push the pod out or using the wrong tool. This procedure was
repeated three times, so the children had an opportunity to help
E2 retrieve the pod from each compartment. The speciﬁc order of
events was as follows:
E1 attracted the participants’ attention to the reward inside the
box by saying “Can you see the orange pod inside there? That has
two jellybeans inside it. I’ll show you how to get it out.” E1 then
demonstrated how to retrieve the reward using the appropriate
tool. For example, when demonstrating how to retrieve the reward
from the orange compartment, E1 picked up the orange dowel, slid
it in the hole andpushed the reward out the other side.While doing
this action E1 stated: “For this compartment, we need to use the
orange stick . . . look! We can push the pod out like this.”When the
pod cameout of the box, E1 opened it to show the jellybeans inside.
E1 then placed the pod back into its compartment (surreptitiously
opening and closing the lid by disengaging and re-engaging the
latch out of the child’s sight) and let the participants have a turn
at retrieving it, saying: “It’s your turn now, you get the pod out.”
Once the participants retrieved the pod, E1 placed it back in its
compartment and said “Ok now [E2’s name] is going to come in
and she is going to have a turn at getting the jellybeans out. She
has never seen this box before.” E1 then opened the door for E2
who subsequently sat opposite the child. E1 proceeded to show
E2 the reward in the box, saying: “Do you see that pod? It has
two jellybeans inside. See if you can get it out.” What was said
next was determined by which of the following three conditions
participants were randomly allocated to:
Cost condition. E1 said to the child, “If [E2’s name] gets the pod
out, then she gets to have the jellybeans! But if she can’t get it
out, then you can have another turn and if you get the pod out
then you can have the jelly beans.” This was termed the “cost”
condition because children choosing to help E2 forfeited the
jellybeans they could have received when her turn was over.
Beneﬁt condition. As with the cost condition E1 said, “If [E2’s
name] gets the pod out, then she gets to have the jellybeans.”
However, E2 then said to the child,“Well I don’t like jellybeans,
so if I get them out then I am going to give them to you.” This
set up a beneﬁcial situation as children choosing to help E2
would directly receive any jellybeans obtained.
No cost condition. E1 said to theparticipants,“[E2’s name] is going
to have a turn to get the pod out now.” This was a neutral
condition where no explicit cost or beneﬁt of helping was
outlined.
After providing the condition-dependent explanation of what
was happening E1 said to E2: “Ok you can try to get that out now,
I just have to go outside and ﬁnish some work.” E1 then left the
room. This was done to minimize social pressure. E2 was then
given 30 s to ‘try’ to retrieve the reward. Across all trials E2 began
by alternating eye gaze between the apparatus and the child, with
a neutral facial expression. If the child did not spontaneously help
she proceeded to poke her ﬁngers into the relevant compartment,
periodically looking at the child and shrugging her shoulders as
if to indicate ignorance of what to do. At no point did E2 make
any statement about what she was trying to do nor did she directly
request help from the child.
Helping scenario
If the child helped E2 retrieve the pod within 30 s E2’s actions were
condition-dependent as follows:
Cost condition. E2 took the jellybeans out of the pod and said
“Great, I’m going to eat these jellybeans now,” then left the
room. This served to highlight how helping would lead to
the child forsaking the potential for accessing the reward
him/herself.
Beneﬁt condition. E2 took the pod, opened it and stated “I don’t
like jellybeans remember, so here, you can have these,” then
gave the pod with the jellybeans to the participant and left the
room.
No cost condition. E2 took the pod and opened in to look inside,
but did not state that she was going to have the jellybeans,
saying “Cool, two jellybeans!” as she left the room.
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E1 then returned, re-loaded the box with the second pod
in a different compartment, and stated “I have another pod
here with two jellybeans inside it, I’m going to put it in the
black/white/orange compartment this time.” E1 then invited E2
to reenter the room and they followed the same procedure as per
the ﬁrst pod. This was repeated for the ﬁnal pod.
No help scenario
If participants did not help E2 in the 30 s trial period, E1 returned
to the room and E2 said to her, “I couldn’t do it!” and subse-
quently left the room. If the participant was in the cost condition,
E1 then said to him/her, “Ok well you can try and get the pod
out now,” and gave the participant another turn, as promised.
If the participant was in the no cost or beneﬁt conditions, E1
removed the ﬁrst pod then re-loaded the box by placing the
second pod in another compartment, stating: “I have another
pod here with two more jellybeans inside it, I’m going to put
it in the black/white/orange compartment this time.” The afore-
outlined procedure was followed and then repeated for the third
compartment.
As the participantwould be losing out on, or gaining, increasing
numbers of jellybeans the more help they provided, the procedure
was designed in such a way that the cost or beneﬁt of helping the
confederate (depending on which condition the participant was
in) would become more apparent and intense as the experiment
continued. For example, if a child in the cost condition helped the
confederate retrieve all three pods he/she would losing out on six
jellybeans.
CODING
Data was scored from videotapes of each session. Each child’s
helping behavior (i.e., was help shown or not) for each of the three
compartments was coded (hence children could score between 0
and 3 for helping), and how long it took them to begin helping
(in seconds), timed from the moment E2 began to operate on the
box. A random sample of 12 children was analyzed by a second
coder, blind to the study aims and the conditions each child was
in. Intra-class correlations (Shrout and Fleiss, 1979) were above
0.98 (p < 0.001) for all latency measures and there was 100%
agreement regarding helping behavior (i.e., Cohen’s kappa = 1.00,
p < 0.001).
RESULTS
TOTAL HELP PROVIDED
As is evident in Table 1, the vast majority of participants (37 out
of 45) provided help on all three compartments, regardless of
condition. Consistent with this, a one-way ANOVA failed to reveal
any signiﬁcant differences in the amount of total help provided
between the Cost (M = 2.67, SD = 0.72), No Cost (M = 2.87,
SD = 0.35), and Beneﬁt (M = 2.47, SD = 1.13) conditions,
F(2,42) = 0.94, p = 0.40, η2p = 0.04.
We also examined the time it took participants to help E2
retrieve the reward on the ﬁrst, second, and third compartment.
There was no signiﬁcant difference between conditions in the time
participants took to help the confederate on the ﬁrst compartment
(MCost = 5.83 s, SD = 3.35 s; MNoCost = 5.46 s, SD = 5.68 s;
and MBeneﬁt = 3.67 s, SD = 5.98 s), F(2,38) = 0.62, p = 0.513,
η2p = 0.04. There was also no difference for the time taken to
help on the second compartment (MCost = 3.63 s, SD = 1.94 s;
MNoCost = 6.54 s, SD = 7.94 s; and MBeneﬁt = 3.21 s, SD = 2.95 s),
F(2,35) = 1.59, p = 0.218, η2p = 0.08, or on the third compart-
ment (MCost = 3.88 s, SD = 4.24 s; MNoCost = 2.83 s, SD = 2.70 s;
and MBeneﬁt = 1.65 s, SD = 1.43 s), F(2,38) = 1.80, p = 0.18,
η2p = 0.09.
LATENCY TO HELP ACROSS COMPARTMENTS
Given the lack of any differences, data was collapsed across con-
ditions. A repeated measures ANOVA, including those children
who helped on all three compartments, was performed in order to
assess the overall differences in the duration for children to provide
help at each compartment (the ﬁrst, second, and third). Results
revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of instance of help provided,
F(2,70) = 4.12, p = 0.02. Post hoc paired-samples t-tests revealed
that the time taken for children to help E2 on the third compart-
ment (M = 2.74 s, SD = 3.09) was signiﬁcantly quicker than the
time taken to help her on the ﬁrst compartment (M = 4.89 s,
SD = 5.14), t(36) = 2.67, p = 0.011, with time taken to help
on the second compartment (M = 3.57 s, SD = 3.17) falling in
between the time taken on the ﬁrst t(36) = 1.66, p = 0.106, and
third compartments, t(36) = 1.27, p = 0.213.
DISCUSSION
It has been previously reported that children’s prosocial motiva-
tions decrease when the demands of a task involve sacriﬁce to
the helper something already possessed (Svetlova et al., 2010). We
thus expected that when given an opportunity to help an unfa-
miliar adult when a future cost is at stake children would be less
likely to do so than when there was no cost involved, or when
there was a direct beneﬁt on offer. Contrary to this expecta-
tion, the amount of help children provided was at near ceiling
levels across all conditions; that is, the large majority of chil-
dren helped the confederate retrieve the reward from all three
Table 1 |The number of children providing help over three compartments (zero help, helped on 1 compartment, helped on 2 compartments, or
helped on all 3 compartments).
Condition Zero compartments One compartment Two compartments Three compartments
Cost 0 2 1 12
No cost 0 0 2 13
Beneﬁt 2 1 0 12
Total 2 3 3 37
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compartments. They were no more likely to help or to be quicker
doing so when a direct beneﬁt was involved than when there was
a direct cost.
Moreover, when the data was collapsed across conditions, it was
found that children increased the speedwithwhich they helped the
experimenter. One explanation of this could be that that children
may have initially had doubts about whether they were allowed to
interact with the box or touch any of the tools when it was not their
‘turn.’ Perhaps once realizing that they were welcome to help E2
after doing so for the ﬁrst time without being reprimanded, they
subsequently helped faster for the other two compartments as this
doubt in theirmindswas alleviated. Regardless of the reasons,what
is key is that this increase in the speed of helping even occurred
in the condition where the total cost incurred also increased with
each act of helping.
The overall results of the current experiment would suggest
that children are highly other-regarding, even in situations where
self-serving motivations may be in direct competition with that of
others. These results contrast with previous experimental studies
which report that even when children do provide help when it
is costly to them, their helping behavior is more delayed as their
motivation to help is lessened by the threat to their own welfare
(Svetlova et al., 2010). Moreover, it has been argued that clear com-
municative cues are necessary for early prosocial responding to
occur, and are important for young children to understand others
desires (Brownell et al., 2009; Svetlova et al., 2010). However, the
children in our study provided spontaneous help in the absence
of explicit instruction or verbal cues. This suggests that, at least by
around 4 years of age, explicit communicative cues are not needed
to elicit helping.
Nevertheless, we cannot know for certain if children were
truly acting on their prosocial motivations, or if they were per-
haps just imitating prosocial behaviors that they understood to
be appropriate for the situation. Williamson et al. (2013) estab-
lished that by 2 years of age, through observing others, children
can learn and apply the appropriate behavioral solution for a
speciﬁc situation. So it may be possible that by 4 years of age,
children have seen others require help, and learnt that the appro-
priate behavior in that situation is to assist the individual in
need: and hence their responses may be considered more nor-
mative than altruistic. Future research is needed to evaluate this
possibility.
Regardless of the reasons for their behavior, the current study
provides an interesting insight into 4-year-olds prosocial tenden-
cies, demonstrating that they spontaneously act to aid a stranger
in need. However the study is not without its limitations. Parent
presence in the testing room was unavoidable as often both chil-
dren and parents wished to stay together for the duration of the
experiment. Despite the experimenters providing parents with a
questionnaire to complete while in the room in order to divert
their attention away from their child, parents could still watch
their children and their mere presence may been enough to cause
an increase in helping behavior. Further, jellybeans are an attrac-
tive reward for young children and we chose to provide only a
small number as a way of emphasizing their scarcity. It is never-
theless possible that if the attractiveness of the reward is increased
children’s tendency to forego themwill decrease, as has been shown
to be the case in older children (Sierksma et al., 2014). These are
matters for future research. Finally, it is possible children sim-
ply failed to appreciate the penalty inherent in the cost condition.
While this may be true it seems unlikely given the lack of shift
in behavior from the ﬁrst to the third trials. If children did not
recognize the cost involved in helping E2 on the ﬁrst trial surely
they would have by the third. Yet there was no discernable change
in helping across trials.
A key feature of the task used here is that children needed to
act in the present while taking into consideration future possible
outcomes. Perhaps the high level of apparent altruism revealed
here is primarily a reﬂection of an immature capacity for doing
this. We did not evaluate episodic foresight abilities in the chil-
dren we tested. However, past studies have established that by
4 years of age children can import a past event from long-term
memory into working memory and act for the future (Sudden-
dorf et al., 2011; Redshaw and Suddendorf, 2013; Suddendorf
and Redshaw, 2013; Prabhakar and Hudson, 2014; Atance et al.,
2015). Thus, while possible, it is unlikely that a deﬁcit in episodic
foresight accounts for the behavior of the children documented
here.
A strength of the current study is that where much of the pre-
vious research examining altruistic helping in young children has
required children to make a discrete choice between helping when
it is costly or not helping at all (e.g., Brownell et al., 2009; Moore,
2009), the current experiment allows children’s decisions to be
more ﬂexible in that they could choose to help, and only to a
certain extent; that is they could help retrieve just one reward
and so incur a minimal cost, or help retrieve all three reward and
incur a larger cost. This method reﬂects situations whereby chil-
dren may choose to help on a continuum, and hence we believe
it is an ecologically valid method of assessing children’s prosocial
tendencies.
The current study also represents a departure from prior work
in which children must make a choice between a division of
resources that is self-advantageous, neutral or other-advantageous
(e.g., Thompson et al., 1998; Fehr et al., 2008; Paulus and Moore,
2014; Williams and Moore, 2014). In these studies children, espe-
cially in the age band tested here, eschew sharing resources,
although some will make choices that beneﬁt others if costs to
the self are minimal. Why, then, were children so willing to
forego reward in the current experiment? A possible explanation
is that in the afore-cited studies emphasis is placed on sharing
and appraisal of inequity, whereas here emphasis is on help-
ing and behaving prosocially. A shift in emphasis of this nature
may be enough to ﬂip behavior. This calls for future research to
explore whether preschool children will show a heightened will-
ingness to share at a cost if such sharing is framed as a helping
endeavor.
Conversely, research undertaken in the last decade has estab-
lished young children’s proclivity to copy the actions of others,
including actions that are clearly irrelevant to the demonstrated,
functional outcome (e.g., using a stick to open a box in order
to retrieve a toy after ﬁrst wiping the stick across the box’s
lid), a proclivity that the available literature suggests is species-
speciﬁc, culturally universal and likely to increase in intensity
with age (Horner and Whiten, 2005; Nielsen and Tomaselli, 2010;
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McGuigan et al., 2011; Flynn and Smith, 2012; Nielsen et al.,
2012, 2014; Marsh et al., 2014). In a recent study, children were
shown how to open a box by an adult who used a sequence of
actions, some which were causally relevant and some which were
not (Nielsen et al., in press). The children could then show an
ostensibly naïve individual how to open the box while the ﬁrst
experimenter was absent. Even under these circumstances chil-
dren reproduced the redundant actions. A similar behavior might
be happening in the current study: that is, children are simply
copying the actions of E1, even when only E2 is present. We cannot
rule out this interpretation – but if it is valid, and future research is
needed to evaluate this possibility, it would suggest children afford
less priority to getting a treat for themselves than they do showing
they have acquired a new skill or that they can do things as others
have done them. This would stand as amajor signiﬁer of our status
as the world’s most “ultra-social” species (Herrmann et al., 2007,
p. 1360).
In this context, a number of authors have argued that children
copy others in order to identify and afﬁliate with them (e.g., to
be liked by them or to show that “I am like you” ; Uzgiris, 1981;
Nadel et al., 1999; Nielsen, 2008; Carpenter, 2010; Nielsen and
Blank, 2011; Over and Carpenter, 2012). This perspective mirrors
the view that (some) prosocial behaviors are driven by children’s
motivation for interaction and not by a genuine motivation to
do something to help others (Paulus and Moore, 2012; see also
Hay, 2009). This interpretation ﬁts the data we present here, and
indeed is more aligned with it than views of the emergence of
prosocial behavior that emphasize empathic concern for the needs
of others (Batson, 1991; Hoffman, 2000), acting to either alleviate
shared distress (Kärtner et al., 2010), or acting on behalf of another
having interpretedhis/her goals as if theywere one’s own (Kenward
and Gredebäck, 2013). However, as already noted, the presence of
parents in the test room may have inﬂuenced children’s reactions,
something that would be consistent with social-normative models
prioritizing the role of the social environment and social inputs in
the emergence of prosociality (Kiang et al., 2004; Brownell et al.,
2009). It is also possible that the behavior of different children
is determined by different motivations, and as Paulus (2014, p.
79) notes in a recent review, “it seems unlikely that the domain of
prosocial behavior as a whole is brought about by one mechanism
or motive.”
The current study provides new insight into the altruistic
behavior of young children. Children may be motivated to help
others because doing so creates a reputation that will be rewarded
in the future (e.g., Trivers, 1971), as part of an inherent drive
to maintain sociality regardless of confronting environmental
events (e.g., Gintis, 2000), because their capacity for empathy
drives them to assist others, or for some hitherto unidentiﬁed
other reason. Regardless of why, this motivation appears to be
a strong one. Continued research is now needed to determine
how strong: research that will help delineate our understanding
of what may prove to be one of the key features of the human
mind.
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